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Abstract
Market engineering is making markets work. Markets are information processing
and information producing information systems which mediate allocation of resources
within or between organizations. Setting up and operating a market in a way that it
works effectively and efficiently is an art and a science. This paper outlines challenges
in this interdisciplinary field of research and presents frameworks for assessing markets.
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1 Introduction – Market Design Matters
In 1899, Leo Baekeland sold the rights to his invention, Velox photographic printing paper,
to George Eastman. Velox was the first commercially successful photographic paper ever
developed and the price George Eastman payed was $1 million. Baekeland had planned to
ask $50,000 and to go down to $25,000 if necessary, but—fortunately for him—Eastman
spoke first and offered $1 million (Asimov, 1982). From an economic perspective, the main
lesson of this short historical example is that market design matters. The rules of who
discloses information at which time, how these bids are transformed to prices and allocations
etc. impact the behavior of market participants as well as the market result. Thus, if one
wants to guide behavior of market participants in order to achieve an desired outcome, e.g.
an efficient allocation of resources, one has to carefully engineer the respective market.
New markets emerge constantly and their conscious design ‘is important because mar-
kets don’t always grow like weeds—some of them are hothouse orchids’ which have to be
administered and cultivated; Time and place have to be established, related goods need to
be assembled, or related markets linked so that complementarities can be handled, incentive
problems have to be overcome, etc.’ (Roth, 2002). In this context, where oftentimes the
point is not to understand the world but to change it, ‘economics looks more like engineering
than it does pure science. Just as a civil engineer applies principles of physics and mechan-
ics to design bridges, economists apply principles of economic analysis to design exchange
mechanisms’ (Varian, 2002).
The engineering of the FCC spectrum auctions in the US (e.g. McAfee and McMillan
(1996)), the job market for graduates in medicine (Roth and Pearson, 1999), the electric
power market in California (Wilson, 2002), and the spectrum license auctions in Europe
(Klemperer, 2002) all teach several important lessons. Market engineering requires ...
1. ... an integrated, holisitic view on markets comprising the microstructure, the business
structure, the IT infrastructure (if existent), the design of the trading object, the
regulatory framework etc.
2. ... a multiplicity of methodologies including theoretical modeling (microeconomics,
game theory, industrial organization theory, value chain theory, Monte Carlo and
agent-based simulations etc.), empiricism (lab experiments, field experiments, anal-
ysis of field data etc.), and constructive approaches (creation of innovative artifacts
like e.g. software prototypes).
3. ... an interdisciplinary approach to cope with the complexity of the integrated, holisitic
view and to provide the multiplicity of methodologies. Especially relevant are eco-
nomics, business administration, information systems, computer science, law, sociol-
ogy, and psychology.
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4. ... the understanding that details matter. There are no standard market designs
which can easily be copied from one application to another—a market mechanism has
to be engineered with attention to details and rigorous consideration of the specific
requirements and surrounding conditions.
Besides the examples for market engineering mentioned above, another area of recent de-
velopment that clearly underscores the necessity of conscious engineering of markets is the
increasing presence and relevance of electronic markets. While in traditional physical mar-
kets the rules might evolve over time, electronic markets make the conscious and structured
design of the rules of interaction indispensable, as they have to be implemented in computer
systems and do not allow spontaneous changes. A predominant domain where economic
engineering has been applied in the last decade is market design (Roth, 2002; Varian, 2002);
Weinhardt, Holtmann, and Neumann (2003) coined the term market engineering.1
2 The origin of Institutions and Markets
Markets have been studied in various disciplines and, not surprisingly, many renowned
researchers have worked on understanding the origin and working of markets: In neoclassical
economic theory, a market is a frictionless place of exchange. It is made up of supply and
demand. The market equates supply and demand and thereby takes care of the allocation
problem, if permitted to do so. In new institutional economics, it is a mechanisms which
usage creates transaction costs. In information systems, markets are inter-organizational
information system. In jurisprudence it is a bundle of contracts and topic for regulation.
The outcome of a market are allocations and information.
Friedrich August von Hayek.2 In order to equate supply and demand, as neoclassic eco-
nomic theory postulates, the market has to have information on its participants’ preferences.
If so, the allocation of goods and services is a relatively easy optimization problem—von
Hayek (1945, pp. 519-520) puts it as follows: ‘If we possess all the relevant information, if we
can start out from a given system of preferences, and if we command complete knowledge of
available means, the problem which remains is purely one of logic. This, however, is emphat-
ically not the economic problem which society faces. And the economic calculus which we
have developed to solve this logical problem, though an important step toward the solution
of the economic problem of society, does not yet provide an answer to it. The reason for this
is that the “data” from which the economic calculus starts are never for the whole society
“given” to a single mind which could work out the implications and can never be so given.
1See also Neumann (2004) for a more extensive discussion.
2In 1974, Friedrich August von Hayek received the Nobel Prize in Economics for his pioneering work in
the theory of money and economic fluctuations and for his penetrating analysis of the interdependence of
economic, social, and institutional phenomena.
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The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by
the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in
concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently
contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem
of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate “given” resources—if ”given” is
taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these
“data.” It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the
members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to
put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in
its totality.’ Thus, according to von Hayek, markets are no mechanical optimization device
but a mechanism to exchange and process information of individual market participants in
order to facilitate exchange transactions.
Ronald H. Coase.3 As this information processing is not costless, Coase (1937, 1960,
1988) discussed the role of so called transaction costs for the existence of markets. The
main sources of costs related to transactions are search and information costs, bargaining and
decision costs, and policing and enforcement costs. In Coase’s view, markets ‘are institutions
that exist to facilitate exchange, that is, they exist in order to reduce the cost of carrying
out exchange transactions. In an economic theory which assumes that transaction costs
are nonexistent, markets have no function to perform, and it seems perfectly reasonable to
develop the theory of exchange by an elaborate analysis of individuals exchanging nuts for
apples on the edge of the forest or some similar fanciful example. This analysis certainly
shows why there is a gain from trade, but it fails to deal with the factors which determine
how much trade there is or what goods are traded. And when economists do speak of market
structure, it has nothing to do with the market as an institution but refers to such things
as the number of firms, product differentiation, and the like, the influence of the social
institutions which facilitate exchange being completely ignored.’ (Coase, 1988, pp. 7-8).
George J. Stigler.4 This view is corroborated by Stigler, who stressed that the ‘world
of zero transaction costs turns out to be as strange as the physical world with zero friction.
Monopolies would be compensated to act like competitors, and insurance companies and
banks would not exist’ (Stigler, 1972, p. 12).
3In 1991, Ronald H. Coase received the Nobel Prize in Economics for his discovery and clarification of
the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of
the economy.
4In 1982, George J. Stigler received the Nobel Prize in Economics for his seminal studies of industrial
structures, functioning of markets, and causes and effects of public regulation.
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Douglass C. North.5 According to Coase and Stigler, a market is more than supply and
demand and transaction costs have to be taken into account: A market is an institution
and its working and performance are determined by the market structure, i.e. the rules
of interaction. According to North (1991, p. 97), ‘Institutions are the humanly devised
constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both
informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and
formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).’ Even if North (1991) does not discuss the
market structure in Coase’s (1988) view, his perspective on institutions helps understanding
what a market institution is. A market is a set of humanly devised constraints that exist in
order to reduce the cost of carrying out exchange transactions.
Vernon L. Smith.6 If a market institution is a set of humanly devised constraints, the
question on the origin of these constraints arises: Where does a market structure come
from? Following Smith (2003), there are two main origins of market institutions as a rational
order: conscious design and undirected evolution. Already in the seventeenth century, the
French philosopher and mathematician Rene´ Descartes ‘contended that all the useful human
institutions were and ought to be deliberate creation(s) of conscious reason [...] a capacity of
the mind to arrive at the truth by a deductive process from a few obvious and undoubtable
premises’ (von Hayek, 1967, p. 85). Accordingly, many market structures are determined by
conscious design.
On the other hand, undesigned, evolutionary processes determine market structures.
Different market places and market structures compete with each other and the fittest
markets survive. ‘Adam Smith developed the idea of emergent order for economics. Truth
is discovered in the form of the intelligence embodied in rules and traditions that have
formed, inscrutably, out of the ancient history of human social interactions. This is the
antithesis of the anthropocentric belief that if an observed social mechanism is functional,
somebody in the unrecorded past must have used reason consciously to create it to serve its
perceived intended purposes.’ (Smith, 2003, p. 470)
Deliberate construction and spontaneous evolution both affect market institutions. ‘Con-
structivism is indeed an engine for generating variation, but is far too limited in its ability
to comprehend and apply all the relevant facts to serve the process of selection, which is
better left to ecological processes.’ (Smith, 2003, p. 470)
5In 1993, Douglass C. North received the Nobel Prize in Economics for having renewed research in
economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and
institutional change.
6In 2002, Vernon L. Smith received the Nobel Prize in Economics for having established laboratory ex-
periments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, especially in the study of alternative market mechanisms.
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3 Frameworks for Assessing and Engineering Markets
Following the historical excursus on markets in Section 2, a market is defined as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Market) A market is a set of humanly devised rules that structure the
interaction and exchange of information by self-interested participants in order to carry out
exchange transactions at a relatively low cost.
As such, markets are constrained by a socio-cultural and legal framework and can be
seen as
• the equation of demand and supply,
• a set of constraints which have to be established,
• a set of constraints which compete for survival,
• an information processing system,
• an entrepreneurial activity, and
• a service.
Engineering markets includes the conscious, structured, systematic, and theoretically
founded procedure of analyzing, designing and introducing market institutions. It can be
defined as follows:
Definition 3.2 (Market Engineering) Market engineering is the process of consciously
setting up or re-structuring a market in order to make it an effective and efficient means for
carrying out exchange transactions.
Objectives of market engineering are
• to analyze and design transaction objects, microstructures, infrastructures, and busi-
ness structures of markets,
• to identify areas of application in which market-based coordination is an effective and
efficient means of coordination, and
• to develop methods, procedures, tools, and knowledge for the engineering of markets
as well as the identification of areas of application for market-based coordination.
In light of the multiple facets of markets and market engineering, it is hardly surprising
that several frameworks can and should be employed to understand, build, and run markets.
Some of them are outlined in the following.7
7Note, that not all of these ideas on engineering markets are entirely new here. See e.g. Holtmann and
Neumann (2003); Neumann and Holtmann (2004); Neumann (2004); Neumann et al. (2006); Weinhardt
et al. (2007).
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3.1 Market Lifecycle Management
Like any product or service, a market follows a lifecycle. As pointed out in Section 2 by
quoting Coase (1988, p. 8), the term market is ambiguous: on the one hand it refers to a
market institution like the NYSE, for example, and on the other hand it refers to a wider
context like the stock market in general, for example.
3.1.1 Lifecycle of markets in a wider context
New markets—not market institutions but markets in a wider context—emerge constantly,
e.g. markets for electricity, emission rights, spectrum licenses, or markets for granting private
credits. The typical phases of a product lifecycle transfer to a market lifecycle, they are
sketched in Figure 1.
sales
profits
time
$
emerging growth maturity decline
(e.g. markets for
private credits)
(e.g. markets for
emission rights)
(e.g. stock markets, B2C and
C2C online markets)
(e.g. B2B
online markets)
Figure 1: Stylized lifecycle of a market in general
Emerging: While a market is emerging, it’s existence is hardly known to the public. Op-
erators of market institutions have rather few competition and have to concentrate on
R&D and engineering, define the product to be traded, and create a customer need for
exchange transactions and an exchange institution, i.e. a marketplace. In this phase,
market operators have rather high expenditures for the aforementioned activities and
cannot yet cover them with revenues generated by the marketplace. Thus, overall
profit is at first negative, as it is virtually for any business one starts in an emerging
market.
An example for a currently emerging market is the market for exchanging credits
between private persons via Internet platforms. This direct interaction of creditors
and borrowers bypasses the conventional intermediation by banks.
Growth: In this second phase, the market in general is growing rapidly and new market
operators likely enter to compete for revenues. Traditional strategies are to emphasize
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marketing, focus on quality, and manage rapid growth of the network of market par-
ticipants, the market operator’s organizational structure, and likely the employed IT
systems.
Network effects play a crucial role in this phase. In many two-sided markets, partici-
pants directly benefit from a high competition of potential counterparts in an exchange
transaction. eBay and its competitors are an example: In many countries eBay is by
far the largest B2C and C2C (and partly B2B) online marketplace. When a buyer
chooses a market platform to purchase a good, she likely picks eBay as there are many
sellers and she thus expects a high chance to find an auction with a low price. On
the contrary, a seller likely sets up his auction on eBay as there are many buyers who
compete for the good and the seller hopes for a high price.8 See e.g. Rochet and Tirole
(2003); Ellison et al. (2004); Chen et al. (2006) for discussions of the importance of
size and network effects for competing market institutions.
An example for a market in the growth phase is the market for emission rights in the
European Union. It is well known that emission rights are traded today and trading
volume will likely increase over the next years. Market operators try to attract trading
volume to become the incumbent and deter entrance by other market operators.
Maturity: When a market is mature, competition among market operators intensifies and
prices for their services fall. Operators have to focus on their costs to survive the price
competition and/ or to focus on niches like special market segments or additional
services.
Stock markets, for example, are rather mature and in Europe we see a fierce com-
petition among market operators for the relatively constant market volume. This
includes price competition, quality differentiation, plans for mergers and consolidation
of market institutions etc.
Decline: When a market declines because there is no need for transactions any more or
participants organize via another venue, high-cost and low-share competitors exit. The
remaining market operators further focus on being low-cost or niche players.
B2B online markets are an example for a once bigger market which declined. We
do not want to claim that there is no need for B2B markets but rather observe that
during the e-commerce hype and dot.com boom there was an exaggerated enthusiasm
for B2B Internet market platforms and many of them did not survive the decline of
this hype.
8Note that on the contrary a buyer would like to choose a marketplace where there is low competition
with other buyers. The same holds for sellers.
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Besides markets which occur ‘naturally’ as a product or service emerges and the desire
for exchanging it comes up, there are markets strictly controlled by regulators. Spectrum
license auctions are an example where a regulator (a country), defines the good (the licenses),
determines beginning and end of a market institution (an auction), and runs the market
without any competition, as no other market operator can enter the primary market for
spectrum licenses.
3.1.2 Lifecycle of a single market institution
While the previous section outlined the lifecycle of markets in general, Figure 2 shows the
lifecycle of a single market institution. The lifecycle starts by a market engineer setting of
the design of a new market. The major phases during design time are designing, testing,
and implementing the set of constraints of the new market institution as well as its infras-
tructure, e.g. a software. These phases will be detailed in Section 3.3; software tools like the
meet2trade platform (Weinhardt et al., 2006), for example, support the work of a market
engineer in these phases.
Figure 2: Stylized lifecycle of a market institution
Once the market is ready for operation, it has to be introduced by allowing trades to
access the market. Likely this will be accompanied by marketing activity to attract traders
and gain liquidity. Running, monitoring, controlling, and managing the market institution
are the phases which follow. Here, the market operator has to provision the market service
and to monitor trading to detect, for example, malicious behavior (e.g. Blume et al., 2006).
In case the performance of the market does not match the requirements, or either the
objectives of the market operator or the environmental conditions have changed, the market
operator has to re-design the market institution.
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For some Internet market platforms, like eBay and Amazon, an interesting tendency can
be observed: after the initial introduction of the electronic market platform, there is no clear
cut distinction between design-time and runtime any more. This equals the fusion of design-
and runtime of other Internet services like Google, for example. These service operators
can continuously experiment with subsets of their user groups (e.g. chosen by random or by
country of origin) and the real-time feedback allows continuous improvement in the design
of their online businesses. This leads to rapid and subtle innovations and allows incumbents
to gain a competitive advantage over potential new entrants.
3.2 Market Engineering Object
Figure 3 shows the so called market engineering object, i.e. a static view on pivotal elements
of a market which a market engineer should bear in mind.
Market Structure
Transaction Object
Micro-
structure
(IT) Infra-
structure
Business
Structure
Agent Behavior
Market Outcome
Socio-economic and Legal Environment
Figure 3: Market Engineering Object
The objective of a market engineer is to achieve a desired market outcome or performance.
To do so, she can design the transaction object as well as the market structure. The market
structure comprises the market microstructure, the (IT) infrastructure, and the business
structure.
These designed elements—the transaction object and the market structure—have only
indirect effect on the market outcome. The link from the structure to the outcome lies
in the behavior of market participants. It is the behavior of market participants which
makes the engineering of markets a major challenge as their are no direct cause-effect rela-
tionships between a market’s structure and its performance. In an abstract setting like a
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game-theoretic model with hyper-rational, utility-optimizing players, their might be direct
cause-effect relationships. However, in the real world, where market participants are bound-
edly rational (e.g. Simon, 1955, 1957; Selten, 2001) and are prone to cognitive biases (e.g.
Neale and Bazerman, 1991; Bazerman, 2006; Gimpel, 2007), the relation of market structure
and market outcome is not straight forward. Usually, market engineers employ a variety
of methodologies to asses the impact a specific market structure has on the participants’
behavior and thus the outcome; these include especially theoretical modelling (game theory,
auction theory, mechanism design etc.) and empirical research (lab and field experiments
etc.).
The socio-economic and legal environment comprises elements which the market engineer
cannot directly influence; examples are the participants’ cultural background and norms,
their preferences, and the applicable laws. See e.g. Neumann (2004) for a discussion of
the design parameters of market structures, Seifert (2006) for an example of studying the
microstructure, Rolli et al. (2006) for an example of approaching the IT infrastructure, and
Burghardt (2006) for an example analyzing the business structure of markets.
3.3 Market Engineering Process
While the market engineering object is a static view on markets, the following process
structures the procedure of engineering a market institution. It is displayed in Figure 4 below
based on Figure 1 of Weinhardt et al. (2007). Besides the phases of the market engineering
process, Figure 4 lists some methods and tools commonly employed in the different phases.
The market engineering process—a more detailed process model of the lifecycle of a mar-
ket institution as displayed in Figure 2—starts with an environmental analysis. Important
sub-phases are the design of the transaction object, the identification of potential partici-
pants, i.e. customers of the market service, and the analysis of requirements. The design
phase deals with the microstructure, the (IT) infrastructure, and the business structure
of the market institution and the evaluation phase assesses the participants behavior (cf.
Figure 3). Following are implementation and introduction of the designed market. The
enumeration of methods and tools in Figure 4 is by far not extensive but is meant to give a
better understanding of a market engineers work in the different phases.
The process model resembles a waterfall model from e.g. software engineering. The
arrows indicate a basically sequential process. However, obviously iterations are sometimes
useful and necessary and the model allows for such iterations. The most obvious one—from
evaluation to design in case the evaluation shows that the (preliminary) design does not
(yet) fulfill the requirements—is sketched in the figure. The less frequent ones are omitted
here for clarity.
See Weinhardt et al. (2003); Neumann (2004); Weinhardt et al. (2007) for more detailed
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Figure 4: Market Engineering Process
discussions of the market engineering process and Schnizler (2007) for an example of applying
the process.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
Market engineering is the process of consciously setting up or re-structuring a market in
order to make it an effective and efficient means for carrying out exchange transactions.
More bluntly, market engineering is making markets work. This requires an integrated,
holisitic view on markets, a multiplicity of methodologies, an interdisciplinary approach,
and the understanding that details matter.
To help market engineers in assessing and designing markets, we presented three frame-
works: Market Lifecycle Management, the Market Engineering Object, and the Market
Engineering Process. Along this presentation, several yet unresolved questions and research
challenges have been pointed out. A major challenge lies in integrating the detailed results
different disciplines already achieved to a holistic, interdisciplinary view on engineering mar-
kets.
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